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ABSTRACT
Smart environments produce large amounts of data by a
plurality of sensors, which constantly track our activities and
desires. To support our daily life, assistive environments
process these data to calculate our intentions and future
actions. In many cases, more information than required are
generated and processed by the assistive system. Thereby,
the system can learn more about the user than intended. By
this, the users’ right to informational self-determination is
injured, because they lose control how their data is used.
In this paper, we present a model to let the user formulate
requirements to protect his privacy in smart environments.
These requirements are transformed into multiple integrity
constraints, which ensure privacy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.4 [Database Management]: Systems—Query Pro-
cessing ; K.4.1 [Computer and Society]: Public Policy
Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Database Systems
1. INTRODUCTION
Assistive systems are designed to support the user at work
(Ambient Assisted Working) and at home (Ambient Assisted
Living). Sensors collect information about the current situ-
ation and actions of the users. These data are stored by the
system and linked to other data, for example social network
profiles. Based on the obtained information, preferences,
patterns of behavior and future events can be calculated.
Furthermore, intentions and future actions of the users are
derived, so that the smart environment can react indepen-
dently to satisfy their needs.
Assistive systems [11] often collect much more information
than needed. In addition, the user usually has no or only a
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very small effect on the storage and processing of his per-
sonal data. In extending an assistive system by a data pro-
tection component, which checks the privacy claims of the
user against the required information of the system, this
problem can be resolved.
Two main principles of data protection are data minimiza-
tion and data avoidance. This includes the design of in-
formation systems as well as the data processing itself. By
means of a data-avoiding sharing of sensor and context in-
formation towards the analysis tools of the assistive system,
not only the privacy-friendliness of the system is improved.
The privacy claims and the required information of the anal-
ysis tools can be implemented as integrity constraints in
the database system that stores the data collected by the
sensors. Due to the integrity constraints, the necessary al-
gorithms for preprocessing and anonymization can be run
directly on the database.
The privacy module examines the users’ requirements and
compares them with the required information of the sys-
tem. Instructions for selection, compression and aggrega-
tion are generated so that only the required data will be
stored and processed in the system. A query can be decom-
posed into multiple subqueries which can achieve sub-goals
already at the sensor level. Thus, a transfer of all data to a
superior computing unit, which executes the actual analysis
algorithms, can be dispensed.
The aim of our work is to develop a privacy-friendly query
processor that implements the aspects of data minimization
and data avoidance. The processor is integrated within the
PArADISE 1 framework. The evaluation of our framework is
based on the sensor and context information collected at the
Smart Appliance Lab of the graduate program MuSAMA 2.
In this article we present the language used to formulate
the data protection requirements. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows: In the second section we present
the Privacy Policy for Smart Environments (PP4SE) and
mechanisms for its automatic generation. Section three gives
a brief overview of the related work. Finally, we draw our
conclusions and an outlook on future work.
1Privacy-aware assistive distributed information system
environment
2Multimodal Smart Appliance ensembles for Mobile
Application
2. POLICIES
In order to collect, to process or to use personal data, the
system has to specify (according to [1]):
1. the purpose and duration of the contract,
2. the extent, nature and purpose of the proposed survey,
3. the processing, use and type of data,
4. the range of stakeholders and
5. the origin of the data (provenance)
One aspect of the PArADISE framework intends to support
the user of assistive systems to maintain his privacy. There-
fore, the privacy-claims of the user have to be defined in a
policy. In this chapter, we introduce the two main types
of privacy constraints and their representation as a privacy
policy for smart environments (PP4SE).
2.1 Sensitive Data
Privacy can be divided into two categories: anonymity and
hiding of specific information.
2.1.1 Stay anonymous
For the protection of personal data, there exist concepts such
as k-anonymity [8] and l-diversity [4].These concepts divide
the attributes of a relation into keys, quasi-identifiers, sensi-
tive data and insensitive data. The aim is that the sensitive
data cannot be clearly assigned to a particular person. Tu-
ples can be uniquely determined by key attributes, so they
should not be published together with sensitive attributes
under any circumstances.
PArADISE implements concepts for relational databases to
anonymize data as soon as possible. Similar to antivirus
programs, the framework integrates new models as soon as
possible to ensure privacy when new variants of attacks arise.
Ubiquitous environments often use resource-limited devices
with low CPU frequency or main memory. To cope this
problem, we try to optimize the privacy-preserving algo-
rithm with regard to such devices.
One example for this is our approach to find quasi-identifiers
in high dimensional datasets. Quasi-identifiers are used to
define which sets of attributes allow the re-identification of
persons or activities, even if key attributes are removed. The
identification of a tuple in a relation using these attribute
combinations is still possible, but not 100% sure. QIs can
be part of a key, but also combinations of sensitive and in-
sensitive data.
Due to the high dimensionality and the large amount of
data generated in an assistive system, it is not easy for an
inexperienced user to recognize which attributes compro-
mise his privacy. The same applies for the derivation of
additional information from the existing data. In [2] we in-
troduced an algorithm which reduced the time to find all
quasi-identifiers by more than 95% (in contrast to the algo-
rithm proposed by [6]). By this, the workload of sensors and
other resource-limited devices is not affected too much. The
method alternates between a bottom-up- and a top-down-
approach and shares the knowledge about (negated) quasi-
identifiers. Per calculation step either the top-down (testing
attribute-combination with many attributes) or bottom-up
(small combinations) method is executed and the results of
the step are passed to the other method.
Quasi-identifiers and key attributes allow the unambiguous
identification of an object, such as a person or an action.
These attributes make it possible to combine information
from different tables, databases or with background knowl-
edge. The key property of an attribute is usually defined
within the database design process. In most cases, system-
generated artificial attributes are created for keys, but sev-
eral existing attributes can be recognized as a key. Keys
should not be passed; they can be linked to information
outside from the system and by this, new information on
the affected object can be determined.
Sensitive data is data that needs to be protected. It depends
on the application domain and the affected person to whom
the data relate, which data is classified as sensitive. In con-
trast to sensitive data, insensitive data are those which do
not necessarily have to be protected.
2.1.2 Protection of secrets
In some assistive systems, it is necessary that the user has
to be identified; so the data is not anonymized. Neverthe-
less, the user may not want to reveal all information about
him or her. In this case, the user has to define his privacy
requirements into a policy.
For an inexperienced user, it is not easy to make meaningful
privacy settings. To make matters worse, in ad-hoc environ-
ments, the sensors and processing computer and the algo-
rithms used can be replaced without the user even noticing
it. For these reasons, it is important that the privacy com-
ponent of the assistive system can generate useful integrity
constraints for the user.
To overcome this problem, we are generating privacy policies
for new devices based on the settings the user has specified
for older devices before. We realize this in three steps. In
the first step, schema mappings [5] between the new device
and all known old devices are generated. The privacy set-
tings of the best fitting devices are adopted for each mapped
attribute. For those attributes on the new device without
a compatible attribute, data mining approaches (clustering,
classification) are used to find out which attributes with sim-
ilar privacy settings are used together. From these attribute
groups we adopt the settings for the unmapped attributes.
In the third step, all attributes without a privacy mapping
are set to PRIVATE, a state where the attribute value can-
not be accessed.
The generated privacy settings for the new application/sen-
sor are only of preliminary nature. It is up to the user to
accept these settings or to modify them later to meet his
desires.
2.2 Privacy policies for smart environments
Hitherto, security models and privacy policies focus on how
whole data records can be protected from unauthorized ac-
cess. Adding a more fine-granular access control allows the
user to specify which information is revealed and how the
data are processed. Data records can be modified by selec-
tion, projection, compression, aggregation and feature ex-
traction (e.g. on motion images) to reduce the amount of
personal information send towards the tools for evaluation
and analysis.
Our privacy policy is based on the draft of the W3C for
Privacy Preferences Platform [10], but leaves out browser-
specific details, such as the management of cookies. In re-
turn, our policy provides additional information for config-
uring data streams, such as the allowed query interval and
possible aggregation levels.
2.2.1 Internal Representation
In this chapter the policy is explained based on a small ex-
ample, which is illustrated in Figure 1. The formal definition
is given in the next section.
1 <policy >
2 <apps>
3 <application id="MyFridge">
4 <appDescription >
5 This is a smart fridge.
6 </appDescription >
7 <modules >
8 <module id="CheckContent" type="basic"
9 required="yes">
10 <moduleDescription >
11 This module will check which
12 amount of food is remaining.
13 </moduleDescription >
14 <attribute -list>
15 <attribute name="amount">
16 <allow>true</allow>
17 <third -party -access >false</third -party -access >
18 <condition >FAT <= 40</ condition >
19 </attribute >
20 </attribute -list>
21 </module >
22 ...
23 <modules >
24 </application >
25 <apps>
26 </policy >
Figure 1: Example for a privacy policy
For internal representation and data exchange, we store the
policy as an XML file. A policy is a set of applications
(apps). An application can be a stand-alone computer pro-
gram, a background process of an operating system or even
a smart environment as a whole. Each application consists
of a unique ID (in the example: MyFridge), which allows
unique identification by its name. In addition, an applica-
tion has a description and a list of functions (modules).
A module of an application is a well-defined task to solve a
specific problem of the entire system. For example, a fridge
has the basic functionality to check its contents (in the exam-
ple: CheckContent) to determine how much food remains.
Another module may implement the automation of buying
new food. A module is characterized by its ID and its type.
Each module consists of a description and an indication if
the functionality is required to execute the application.
All modules provide an attribute-list containing all needed
attributes. Attribute-lists can be connected with boolean
operators to provide different alternatives if a user does not
want to reveal a specific combination of personal informa-
tion. An attribute is identified by its name and persists
of different privacy settings. The access conditions for the
application are controlled by the allow - (the application it-
self) and third-party-access-tag (to shrink continued process-
ing). The user can specify several conditions under which
the information is disclosed. Additionally, settings regard-
ing aggregation and confidentiality (privacy-level of detail)
are specified. In the example, the application has access to
the amount of food remaining for every item in the fridge,
except of the food which has more than 40% of fat.
The separation of functions and applications is important,
because this ensures that information can only be used for
the intended purpose. Thus, the user may share his data
for personalized advertisements. On the other side, the user
does not want this information to be transmitted to his in-
surance company, so that his contribution rate will be ad-
justed according to his eating habits.
Due to space limitations, we cannot present the whole pol-
icy in detail. For more details, please refer to [3]. The
policies are constructed by modifying the underlying DOM-
structure of the XML-documents. The user manages the
policies through a simple graphical interface.
2.2.2 Formal definition
Our privacy policy model is a 9-tupel P := (APP, M, ATTR,
C, I, A, AGG, ANO, f), where
• APP := a set of applications
• M := a set of modules
• ATTR := a set of attributes
• C := a set of conditions
• I := a set of query-intervals
• A := a set of access conditions
• AGG := a set of aggregation functions
• ANO := a set of anonymization functions
• f := a partially defined function, which maps a combi-
nation of an application app ∈ APP, a module m ∈ M
and an attribute attr ∈ ATTR to a set of conditions
C’ ⊆ C, as well as a query interval i ∈ I, several access
conditions A’ ⊂ A, an aggregate function agg ∈ AGG
and an anonymization function ano ∈ ANO.
f := (app,m, attr)→ (C′, i, A′, agg, ano)
The terms application, module, attribute and (access) con-
dition have been introduced above. The term interval is
related to data streams and their continuous collect of in-
formation. By specifying an interval, the user can decide
in which frequency his data can be accessed. Aggregation
functions allow the user to hide raw data. Typical functions
are sums, minimum and maximum values and medians as
well as complex, statistical constructs like correlation coef-
ficients and regression lines. By selecting an anonymization
function f, the user can decide which privacy model is used
in the postprocessing stage. If no method is selected, an
appropriate one is selected automatically.
Having selected the function f, the privacy requirements
are transformed into Multiple Access-control Generated In-
tegrity Constraints (MAGIC) for specific query languages
and concrete (database) systems.
3. RELATEDWORK
Usually, simple access control lists (ACL) are often used for
the formulation and enforcement of privacy rights. ACLs
define the access rights only for files, but not for content.
Besides pure rights management, privacy policies can be
used as an advanced concept that allows a more detailed
definition of privacy claims.
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is proposing two
standards for the formulation of privacy policies. On the one
hand, there is the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project
[10], a markup language that is intended for use in browsers.
The user can generally define what kind of websites can be
accessed. The website provider can formulate what data he
stores, e.g. by means of cookies, about the user. If these
requirements contain contradictions, the user is warned.
In addition to the P3P, the W3C has suggested the Enter-
prise Privacy Authorization Language [9], another language
that is specifically designed for the exchange of data in busi-
ness environments. Both language proposals are based on
the XML format and provide a rule-based access mechanism
in which roles and conditions are formulated to grant or deny
write and read access rights.
Besides the above mentioned W3C standards, there exist
many other language proposals, such as the eXtensible Ac-
cess Control Markup Language [7]. These do not differ sub-
stantially from the existing language proposals.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The protection of privacy in ubiquitous environments is a
challenging task. A variety of sensors capture every moment
of our life. In this paper, we present a method to formulate
privacy claims on an assistive system, so that we become the
master of our own personal data. By reducing and prepro-
cessing the data generated by the sensors and processed by
the system, privacy can be ensured in smart environments.
Powered by the data protection profiles of the users, the
acquisitiveness of assistive systems is limited. Our privacy-
aware query processor gives a comprehensive tool to ensure
privacy by analyzing queries and optionally rewrites them.
At the present time, we integrate existing data protection
techniques and analysis functions (in the context of student
projects) into the query processor. It is recommended that
further research should be undertaken in the following areas:
• Automatic comparison between the privacy require-
ments of the user and the required information of the
system.
• Anti-virus programs offer protection against the
newest malicious software. Can this procedure be
adapted to data mining technologies and privacy
protection mechanism?
Further studies, which take the comparison of the privacy
constraints and the analysis functions into account, will need
to be performed. We are in the process of investigating the
transformation process of complex analysis functions into
SQL-queries.
Unfortunately, many aspects and details could not be in-
cluded in this article due to reasons of space. A longer ver-
sion of this paper is available as a technical report [3].
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